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actionstopressabroadrangeofbothsystemicdisparatetreatment13and
disparateimpactclaims.14
 Unfortunately,inmyview,theimportanceoftheWalͲMartdecisionisalso
limitedforTitleVIIclassactions,asitisforotherkindsofclassactions,bythe
Court’srecentdecisionsincasesdealingwiththearbitrationofconsumer
misrepresentationandantitrustclaimsratherthandiscriminationclaims.Through
thesedecisions,includingConcepcionandItalianColors,theRobertsCourtin
effectofferedanybusinessoutsidethetransportationindustrytheoptionof
arbitrationasabaragainstcollectiveactionsbroughtbyanyeconomically
subordinateparties,includingemployees,uponwhomthebusinesscanimpose
agreements.Thesedecisions,intandemwiththeCourt’searlierapplicationofthe
FAAtoemploymentcontracts,15empowermostemployerstoprecludenotonly
classͲbasedlitigation,butalsoclassͲbasedarbitration.
 Thisessaywillproceedasfollows.PartIItracesthedevelopmentof
TitleVIIclassactionsforbothdisparatetreatmentanddisparateimpactclaims.
PartIIIexaminesthepredictabilityandmanageableimpactoftheprimaryholding
oftheWalͲMartdecision,itsapplicationofRule23(a)(2)’sconditioningof
certificationontheexistenceofacommonissueoffactorlaw.PartIVprovidesa
parallelassessmentoftheCourt’spronouncementonthelimitsofRule23(b)(2)
classactions.WhilethisassessmentacknowledgestheimportanceoftheCourt’s
pronouncementson(b)(2),includingtroublesomedictalimitingtheuseof
litigationmodels,theassessmentconcludesthatthesepronouncementsdonot
provideinsurmountablebarrierstoTitleVIIclassactions.PartV,however,
explainsthatsuchbarriershavebeenerectedbytheCourt’smoreimportant
interpretationsoftheFAA.
 

13Seepages4Ͳ7infra.
14Seepages7Ͳ8infra.
15SeeCircuitCityStores,Inc.v.Adams,532U.S.105(2001);Gilmerv.Interstate/JohnsonLane
Corp.,500U.S.20(1991);andpages31Ͳ33infra.
II.TheSatisfactionofRule23’sCommonalityConditionforTitleVIIClassAction
ClaimsͲͲ
 TitleVIIdoesnotincludeaprovisionforprivatecollectiveactions.16The
developmentofTitleVIIdoctrine,however,soonmadeobvioushowthe
individualprivateactionscontemplatedbyTitleVII17notonlycouldbe
permissivelyjoinedunderRule20oftheFRCP,18butalsocouldbecertified
appropriatelyasclassactionsunderRule23.Rule23hadbeenreformulatedtwo
yearsafterthepassageofTitleVIIinparttoclarifyhowcourtscoulduseclass
actionstomakelitigationmoreefficientundercertainconditions.19Those
conditions,asstressedinWalͲMart,includearequirementforalltypesofplaintiff
classactionsthattherebesomeissueoffactorlawthatiscommonforagroupof
claimantstoonumeroustobeefficientlyjoinedasnamedplaintiffs.20Without
suchcommonality,therecanbenoefficiencygainsintryingtheclaimstogether.
 SoonafterthepassageofTitleVIItheCourtstructuredtwotypesofTitleVII
privateactionsthatoftenframeasalientcommonissueoffactformanylitigants.
Onetypewasmodeledonthepubliccivilactionprovision,§707,which
empowerstheAttorneyGeneral(nowtheEEOC)21tobringactionsagainst
employersforengagingina“patternorpracticeofresistancetothefull
enjoymentofanyoftherightssecured”byTitleVIIandtoseekinjunctivereliefto
restrainthepractice.22The“rightssecured”byTitleVIIofcourseincludetheright

16TheFairLaborStandardsAct,whichprovidesrightsofactionforboththeAgeDiscrimination
inEmploymentActandtheEqualPayAct,bycontrast,doesincludeaprovisionforanemployee
oremployeesbringingactions“forandinbehalfofhimselforthemselvesandotheremployees
similarlysituated”whooptintotheactionbygiving“consentinwriting.”29U.S.C.§216(b).
17See42U.S.C.§2000eͲ5(f).
18Fed.R.Civ.P.20.
19SeeAdvisoryCommittee’sNotes,28U.S.CApp.695Ͳ697.
20Theconditionsarethattheclassbe“sonumerousthatjoinderofallmemberis
impracticable,”thttherebe“questionsoflaworfactcommontotheclass,”thatthe“claimsor
defensesoftherepresentativepartiesaretypical,”andthatthe“representativepartieswill
fairlyandadequateprotecttheinterestsoftheclass.”Fed.R.Civ.P.23(a).
21See42U.S.C.§2000eͲ6(a),(e).
22Id.
tobefreeoftheunlawfuldiscriminationprohibitedby§703.23Further,the
unlawfuldiscriminationforwhichthegenerallyinanimatecorporateemployersin
oureconomyareresponsibleunder§703includeoneoragroupoftheir
authorizedagentstakingintoaccount,withorwithoutanimus,oneofTitleVII’s
prohibitedstatuscategoriesinmakingapersonneldecisionordecisionsthatthe
agentshaveauthoritytomakefortheemployer.24Thus,ifprivateindividuals
claimthattheyhavebeenvictimizedbythesameagentoragentsbecauseofthe
samediscriminatorybias,theymaybepresentingacommonissueoffactfor
litigation,thesamepredominantissuethatwouldbepresentedinapublic
“patternorpractice”casebroughtunder§707–whetherornotsuchapractice
orpatternexistedfortheseagents.
 Bystructuringpatternorpracticelitigationintotwophases,moreover,the
Courtmadeitevenmorepotentiallyefficientandthusappropriatetoemploya
privateclassactiontoattackapatternorpracticeofintentionaldiscrimination.
TheCourtcontemplatedafirstphaseoflitigationtodeterminetheexistencevel
nonofthepatternorpracticeandtoconsidergeneralinjunctiveremedies,and
thenasecondphasetodeterminetheidentityoftheactualvictimsandthe
consequentreliefavailabletoindividuals.TheCourtfirstsuggestedthisdivisionin
Franksv.Bowman,25adecisionreviewingandreversingthedenialofretroactive
seniorityrelieftomembersofacertifiedclassofblackswhohadbeendenied
employmentasoverͲtheͲroaddriversbyacompanythathadbeendeterminedto
haveageneralcompanyͲwidepatternofdiscriminationagainsthiringblacksfor
suchpositions.26TheCourtheldthatabsentspecialcircumstancesthelower
courtsgenerallyshouldgrantclassͲbasedretroactiveseniorityasanaspectofthe
reliefprovidedidentifiablevictimsofillegaldiscrimination,butthatthe
identificationofthesevictimswouldhavetoawaitfurtherproceedingsthat

2342U.S.C.§2000eͲ2(a).
24TitleVIIdefinestheterm“employer”toinclude“anyagent.”42U.S.C.§2000e(b).TheCourt
hasconfirmedthatthismeansemployersareliablefortheadverse“tangible”resultsoftheir
authorizedagents’discriminatoryemploymentactions.See,e.g.,Faragherv.CityofBocaRaton,
524U.S.775(1998);MeritorSavingsBankv.Vinson,477U.S.57,70Ͳ71(1986).
25424U.S.747(1976).
26Id.at750.
assumethefindingofthegeneralpracticeorpatternintheclassaction.27The
Courtsignificantlyalsoexplainedthatthefindingofapatternofdiscriminationin
thefirstphasewoulddeterminehowthesecondphasewouldbeconducted:“...
petitionersherehavecarriedtheirburdenofdemonstratingtheexistenceofa
discriminatoryhiringpatternandpracticebytherespondentsand,therefore,the
burdenwillbeuponrespondentstoprovethatindividualswhoreapplywerenot
infactvictimsofprevioushiringdiscrimination.”28
 TheCourtformalizedboththisseparationofpatternandpracticelitigation
intotwophasesandalsothereversaloftheburdenofproofontoanemployerͲ
defendantinthesecondphasethefollowingyearinTeamstersv.UnitedStates,29
a§707publicactionbroughtagainstanothertruckingcompanyandaunionfora
similarcompanyͲwidepolicyofdiscriminationagainstblacksinhiringforoverͲ
theͲrodetruckingpositions.TheCourtexplained:“[A]court’sfindingofapattern
orpracticejustifiesanawardofprospectiverelief....Aswastrueofthe
particularfactsinFrank,andasistypicalofTitleVIIpatternͲorͲpracticesuits,the
questionofindividualreliefdoesnotariseuntilithasbeenprovedthatthe
employerhasfollowedanemploymentpolicyofunlawfuldiscrimination.The
forceofthatproofdoesnotdissipateattheremedialstageofthetrial....Asin
Franks,theburdenthenrestsontheemployertodemonstratethattheindividual
applicantwasdeniedanemploymentopportunityforlawfulreasons.”30Seven
yearslatertheCourtconfirmedtheapplicabilityofTeamsterstoprivateclass
actions.31

27Id.at772.
28Id.
29431U.S.324(1977).
30Id.at361.
31“Whileafindingofapatternorpracticeofdiscriminationitselfjustifiesanawardof
prospectiverelieftotheclass,additionalproceedingsareordinarilyrequiredtodeterminethe
scopeofindividualreliefforthemembersoftheclass.”Cooperv.FederalReserveBankof
Richmond,467U.S.867,876(1974)(holdingthatafindingoftheabsenceofapatternor
practicedoesnotprecludeindividualclaimsofdiscrimination).Seealsoid.atn.9(“Although
TeamstersinvolvedanactionlitigatedonthemeritsbytheGovernmentasplaintiffunder§
707(a)oftheAct,itisplainthattheelementsofaprimafaciepatternͲorͲpracticecasearethe
sameinaprivateclassaction.”)
 TheuseoftheTeamsterstwoͲphaselitigationstructureforpatternand
practicecasesinprivateclassactionsshouldnotbesurprising.TheTeamsters
structuremakesresolutionofthecommonissueofwhetheragentsofthe
employerengagedinapatternorpracticeofdiscriminationcentraltotheentire
litigation.Everysubsequentissueandthewayitistoberesolved,includingthe
individualreliefassignedtothesecondstage,turnsonresolvingthiscommon
issue.Theefficiencyofresolvingatonetimetheissueforallthosepotentially
affectedbytheallegeddiscriminatorypatternorpracticeisobvious.
 Thedisparateimpactcauseofactionprovidestheotherdoctrinalsupport
forTitleVIIclassactions.Inthiscauseofaction,firstformulatedintheseminal
Griggsv.DukePower32caseandlatercodifiedbythe1991Act,33aplaintiffcan
establishillegaldiscriminationeither(1)bydemonstratingthataparticular,
perhapsostensiblyneutral,practiceofanemployerhasadisproportionateor
disparateimpactontheemploymentopportunitiesofmembersoftheplaintiff’s
TitleVIIͲdefinedstatusgroup–unlesstheemployercandemonstratethepriceis
“jobrelated”and“consistentwithbusinessnecessity”;or(2)eveniftheemployer
canmakethelatterdemonstration,bydemonstratinganalternativepractice,not
adoptedbytheemployer,thatcouldservetheemployer’sbusinesspurpose
withoutsuchanimpact.34Likeplaintiffsdemonstratingapatternorpracticeof
intentionaldiscrimination,plaintiffspressingadisparateimpactclaimcanobtain
aprospectiveordertoeliminatethepracticebymakingoneofthese
demonstrations,butcannotobtainindividualreliefsuchasbackpayand
instatementtoapositiondeniedthemwithoutfurtherlitigationtodeterminein
whichcasesthechallengedpracticeactuallycausedthedenial.35
 Thisfurtherremediallitigationindisparateimpactcases,likethesecond
stageofpatternͲorͲpracticelitigation,thusturnsonansweringcommonquestions
inafirststage.Underdisparateimpactdoctrinepotentialliabilitytonumerous

32401U.S.424(1971).
3342U.S.C.§2000eͲ2(k).
34Id.
35Plaintiffscannotrecovercompensatoryorpunitivedamagesfordisparateimpactclaims.42
U.S.C.§1981A(a)(1).
membersofaplaintiff’sTitleVIIͲdefinedstatusgroupwillturnoncommon
answerstothreequestions–whethertheostensiblyneutralpracticehasa
disparateimpactontheplaintiff’sTitleVIIͲdefinedstatusgroup,whetherthe
practiceisjobͲrelatedandconsistentwithbusinessnecessity,andwhetheran
effectivealternativepracticewasnotadopted.Answeringthesecommon
questionsinonetrialforallthosepotentiallyaffected,likeansweringthecentral
commonquestioninapatternͲorͲpracticecase,obviouslyservestheefficiency
goalofRule23.
 Thecentralityofcommonquestionsinbothdisparateimpactand
intentionalpatternͲorͲpracticecases,however,doesnotmeanthatanyTitleVII
claimofaparticulartypeofprohibitedTitleVIIdiscrimination,suchasraceorsex
discrimination,sharescommonquestionswithallotherpossibleclaimsofthat
typeofdiscriminationagainstthesameemployer.TheCourtrejectedsuchan
“acrossͲtheͲboardrule”forcertificationofallemploymentdiscriminationclasses
inGeneralTelephoneCo.ofSouthwestv.Falcon.36TheFalconCourtreminded
lowercourtsthatsinceTitleVII“containsnospecialauthorizationforclass
suits,”37anindividuallitigantmustmeetalltheprerequisiteconditionsofRule23
forclasscertification,includingcommonality:“aTitleVIIclassaction,likeany
otherclassaction,mayonlybecertifiedifthetrialcourtissatisfied,aftera
rigorousanalysis,thattheprerequisitesofRule23(a)havebeensatisfied.”38
Furthermore,theCourtnotedthisrigorousanalysissometimesmayhave“to
probebehindthepleadings.”39TheCourtconcludedthatplaintiffFalcon’scase
shouldnothavebeencertifiedbecausehis“complaintprovidedaninsufficient
basisforconcludingthattheadjudicationofhisclaimofdiscriminationin
promotionwouldrequirethedecisionofanycommonquestionconcerningthe
failuretohiremoreMexicanͲAmericans.”40Hedidnot,inotherwords,make
allegationstosupportatheorythatanyprohibitednationalorigindiscrimination
towhichhewassubjectedbyanagentoftheemployerͲdefendantalsoaffected

36457U.S.147(1982).
37Id.at156
38Id.at161.
39Id.at160.
40Id.at158.
decisionsnottohiremembersoftheclassofMexicanͲAmericanshesoughtto
represent.Predictably,theCourtnoted,theactualtrialofFalcon’sindividual
promotiondiscriminationandclasshiringclaimsunderdifferenttheories
providednoeconomyand“mightaswellhavebeentriedseparately.”41
III.TheWalͲMartCourt’sHoldingonCommonality–
 Giventheabovehistory,andespeciallytheFalconCourt’siterationthat
courtsshouldnotcertifyTitleVIIclassactionswithoutrigorousanalysisofthe
satisfactionofRule23’sprerequisites,nooneshouldhavebeensurprisedbythe
RobertsCourt’srefusaltosanctionthecertificationoftheWalͲMartclassbecause
itfailedtoposeacommonissueoflaworfactformembersoftherequested
class.ThelowercourtsinWalͲMarthadapprovedthecertificationofaclassofa
millionandhalfcurrentandformerfemaleemployeesofWalͲMartwhoalleged
sexͲbaseddiscriminationintheirpayandpromotions.Undersettledand
uncontroversiallaw,WalͲMartasacorporateprincipalwouldbestrictlyliablefor
anydiscriminatorypayorpromotiondecisionmadebyanyofitshumanagents
withthedelegatedauthoritytodeterminepayorpromotion.42Thiscommon
strictliability,however,didnotpresentacommonissueuponwhichtobase
certification.Giventhesizeanddecentralizedpersonneloperationalstructureof
WalͲMart,itwasnotpossiblefortheplaintiffstoclaimthatthesamegroupof
decisionmakersmadealltheallegedlydiscriminatorypayandpromotion
decisions.PlaintiffsinsteadstressedthatWalͲMart’sseniormanagement
delegateddiscretionoverpayandpromotiontolocalmanagers.Provingapattern
orpracticeofdiscriminationbysomeofthesemanagerswouldnotprove
discriminationbyothersorjustifyanyburdenͲshiftingpresumptionof
discriminationinindividualcasesinvolvingothermanagers.Thus,atheoryofWalͲ
Martdisparatetreatmentliabilitybasedonsettledandacceptedagencylawcould
notpresentanissuecapableofcommonresolutionuponwhichtobase
certification.

41Id.at159.
42Seenote24andpage5supra.
 Plaintiffs’attorneyshadanothertheoryuponwhichtobasedisparate
treatmentliabilitythatmightpresentacommonissuerelevanttoanyandall
claimsofdiscriminatorydecisionsbylocalmanagers.Thattheory,as
acknowledgedbyJusticeScaliainhismajorityopinion,43wasthatWalͲMart
shouldbeliableforitsseniormanagement’sawarenessofandfailuretorespond
tothedisproportionateexerciseoflocaldiscretioninfavorofmen;inother
words,“itsrefusaltocabinitsmanagers’authorityamountstodisparate
treatment.”44Underthistheory,thefaultuponwhichWalͲMart’sliabilityisbased
isnotthefaultofthevariousandvariedlocaldecisionmakers,butratherthe
faultoftheseniormanagerswhoareresponsiblefortheentirecompany.
 Afteracknowledgingthistheoryinhisstatementofthecase,JusticeScalia
failedtoaddressitdirectlyinhisanalysisofcommonality.Instead,relyingon
languagefromafootnoteinFalcon,45hesimplyassertedthatdemonstrating
commonalityforcertificationofacompanywideclassofallegeddiscrimination
victimsrequireseitherisolatingsome“testingprocedureorothercompanywide
evaluationsystemthatcanbechargedwithbias”orproviding“significantproof”
thatthe“employeroperatedunderageneralpolicyofdiscrimination.”46Justice
ScaliathenexplainedthattheWalͲMartplaintiffsmetneitherrequirement.He
stressedthatWalͲMarthadaformalpolicyforbiddingsexdiscriminationand
“imposespenalties[onmanagers]fordenialsofequalopportunity”;47andhe
assertedthattheplaintiffsonlyevidenceofa“generalpolicyofdiscrimination”
wastestimonyfromasociologistwhotestified“thatWalͲMarthasa“strong
corporateculture”thatmakesit“vulnerable”to“genderbias”,”butwhocould
notcalculatethelevelofdiscriminationthatmightresult.48
 PlaintifflawyersmightbedisappointedbysomeofJusticeScalia’slanguage
andhisquicktreatmentofthetheorythatWalͲMart’sliabilityshouldbebasedon

43131S.Ct.at2548.
44Id.
45457U.S.at159n.15.
46131S.Ct.at2553.
47Id.
48Id.
thefailureofseniormanagementtocontroldiscriminationbylocalmanagers,
ratherthanonthelocalmanagers’actsofdiscrimination.Thetheorymayseema
promisingwaytoachieveexpanded,companyͲwidecertification.Withthe
approvaloftheSupremeCourt,49lowercourts,borrowingfromthecommonlaw
tortofnegligentsupervision,50haveconsistentlyappliedanegligencestandardfor
employerliabilityforcoͲworkerdiscriminatoryharassmentofotheremployees,51
wheretherewouldbenostrictrespondeatsuperiorliabilityunderagencylaw
becausetheharassmentwasoutsidethescopeofemployment.52Demonstrating
seniormanagementnegligenceisnotnecessaryforcompanyliabilityfor
decisions,likethosesettingpayandpromotions,withinthescopeofemployment
andtheauthorityofcorporatemanagers,butitcouldestablishcommonalityfor
purposesofanexpandedclasscertification.
 ThefactthatJusticeScaliadidnotaddressthispotentialbasisfor
commonalityultimatelyshouldnotbesurprising,however.First,theplaintiffs’
attorneysinWalͲMartdidnot,andonthefactsofthecase,couldnotforcefully
advanceanegligenceͲbasedtheoryofcompanyliabilityonwhichtobase
commonality.NegligenceͲbasedcompanyliabilityfordiscriminatoryharassment
requiresonlysupervisoryagents’knowledgeorconstructiveknowledgeofand
failuretocontrolcoͲworkerdiscriminatoryharassment.Unlikeharassment,
however,authorizedpersonneldecisions,likethosegoverningpromotionsand
pay,arenotostensiblyproblematic.NegligenceͲbasedliabilityforostensibly
appropriatedecisionswouldrequireknowledgeorconstructiveknowledgenot
onlyofthedecisions,butalsoofadiscriminatorymotivationunderlyingthe
decisions.InWalͲMart,nostrongevidenceofseniormanagementknowledgeof
widespreaddiscriminatorymotivationwasadvanced.53

49SeeFaragherv.CityofBocaRaton,524U.S.775,799Ͳ800(1998).
50SeeRestatementoftheLaw,EmploymentLaw§4.04.
51See,e.g.,Crowleyv.L.L.Bean,Inc.,303F.3d387,401(1stCir.2002);EEOCv.HaciendaHotel,
881F.2d1504,1516(9thCir.1989).
52SeeBurlingtonIndustries,Inc.v.Ellerth,524U.S.742,758(1998)(“generalruleisthatsexual
harassmentbyasuperiorisnotconsideredwithinthescopeofemployment”).
53TheplaintiffsdidnotoffersufficientevidenceeventoimpelJusticeScaliatorespondtoa
theoryofseniormanagementnegligence.JusticeScaliaconsideredanddismissedplaintiffs’
 Plaintiffs’attorneysmighthopethatseniormanagersshouldbeassigned
constructiveknowledgeoftheirsubordinates’discriminatorymotivationbasedon
generalstatisticsofthesortpresentedbytheWalͲMartplaintiffs’experts.These
statisticsshowedthatfemalesgenerallyhadfaredworseinpayandpromotions
throughoutthecompany.54Anassignmentofconstructiveknowledgeof
discriminationbasedonsuchstatistics,however,effectivelywouldentailmaking
companiesvulnerabletojudicialcontroloftheirpersonnelpolicieswhenever
theirseniormanagementfailedtosecureproportionalsuccessforeveryTitleVIIͲ
definedstatusgroup.Hopingforthepronouncementofsuchlawfroma
conservativeCourtthatdisfavorsanythingthatwouldencourage“quotas”55
certainlyseemschimerical.56Ifseniormanagementnegligenceistobeabasisfor
commonalityinfutureattemptstosecurecompanywidecertification,itwillhave
tobethroughevidenceofseniormanagementindifferencetoknownpervasive
discriminatorymotivation,notsimplytoknowndisproportionatestatistics.
 Furthermore,unlikeestablishingliabilitythroughthedemonstrationofa
companyͲwidepolicyofdiscrimination,establishingcompanyliabilitybasedon
seniormanagementindifferencetoknowndiscriminatorydelegateddecision
makingbysubordinatemanagers,wouldnotnecessarilyjustifyapresumptionof
discriminationbyallsubordinatemanagers.Itisnotclearthereforethat
resolutionoftheissueofseniormanagementnegligenceadvancesanyclaimsfor
individualreliefforpastdiscrimination.Claimantsforindividualreliefstillwould

companyͲwideandregionͲwidestatisticsandanecdotalevidenceofdiscriminationonlyas
proofofacompanyͲwidepolicyofdiscrimination,notasproofofseniormanagement
knowledgeofpervasivediscriminationbymanyjuniormanagers.131S.Ct.at2555Ͳ2557.
54Id.at2555.
55See,e.g.,Ricciv.DeStefano,557U.S.557,561(2009)(employerviolatesTitleVIIwhenit
changesanemploymentpracticeinordertoremedydisproportionateimpactofpriorpractice
inabsenceofstrongbasisofevidencethatpriorpracticewasillegaldiscrimination).
56Asidefromthispoliticalrealism,MichaelSelmihasarguedthatholdingemployersliablefor
imbalancesintheirworkforcessolelybecauseseniormanagementisawareofthose
imbalancescouldresultinmoretolerateddiscriminationbecauseitwoulddiscourage
employersfromcollectinginformationthatmightleadtosuchawareness.SeeMichaelSelmi,
TheorizingSystemicDisparateTreatmentLaw,32Berk.J.ofEmp.andLab.L.477,504(2011).
Assumingdifferentpoliticalrealities,andadifferentSupremeCourt,however,thelawcould
imposeaffirmativeobligationsonemployerstostudyandremedyunjustifiedimbalances.
havetheburdenofprovingtheywerevictimsofaparticularsubordinate
manager’sdiscriminationevenafterprovingseniormanagement’snegligence.
ThelatterproofwouldjustifyonlycompanyͲwideprospectiveremediesandthus
perhapsonlycertificationofaclassseekingsuchremedies.57
 TheWalͲMartplaintiffs’strongestcaseforcommonalitywasbasednoton
theirdisparatetreatmentpatternorpracticeclaim,butratherontheirclaimthat
WalͲMart’sdelegationtolocalmanagersofauthorityoverpayandpromotions
hadadisparateimpactonfemaleemployees.Thisdelegationwasacentralpolicy
ofthecompanythataffectedallmembersoftheclassforwhichcertificationwas
sought.Likeanydisparateimpactclaim,itthusseemedtopresentthecommon
issuesofimpactandjustification.58Moreover,in1988theCourthadheldin
Watsonv.FortWorthBankandTrust,59acaseinvolvingabank’sdelegationof
personneldiscretiontosupervisors,thatdisparateimpactanalysiscouldbe
appliedto“subjectiveemploymentcriteria.”60
 Apartfromprovidingapossiblecommonissueforcertification,using
disparateimpactanalysistochallengeacompany’ssystemofdelegated
discretion,ratherthansomesubjectivecriteriaorotherfactorguidingthat
discretion,seemedoddandunpromising,however.Thesamestatisticsthat
woulddemonstrateadisproportionateimpactfromageneralsystemofunguided
delegationonaplaintiff’sTitleVIIͲdefinedstatusgroupwouldalsodemonstrate
thatthecompanywaspervadedwithdiscriminatingdecisionmakers.The
delegationofpersonneldiscretionwillresultinadiscriminatoryeffectonlyifthe
delegeesareexercisingthatdiscretionwithdiscriminatoryintent.Furthermore,
proofofonlyadiscriminatoryimpact,asopposedtoproofofadiscriminatory
intent,canberebuttedbyabusinessjustification,whichisnothardforany
businesstoidentifyforitsdelegationofdiscretiontosupervisors.

57Seepage18infra.
58Seepages7Ͳ8supra.
59487U.S.977(1988).
60Id.at990.
 Giventhatadisparateimpactchallengetotheunguideddelegationof
discretion,likeasystemicdisparatetreatmentchallenge,ultimatelycanbe
successfulonlybyprovingthatsomeofthedelegeeswereintentionally
discriminating,itisnotsurprisingthatJusticeScaliaappliedthesame
commonalityanalysistoboth.Neitherchallengeturnsonacommonissue
becauseeachultimatelyrequiresadeterminationofhowdiscretionisexercised
byindividualdelegees:“demonstratingtheinvalidityofonemanager’suseof
discretionwilldonothingtodemonstratetheinvalidityofanother’s.”61For
certificationofacompanyͲwideclassineithertypeofchallengethen,plaintiffs
must“identifyacommonmodeofexercisingdiscretionthatpervadestheentire
company.”62JusticeScalia,quotinglanguagefromJusticeO’Connor’sopinionin
Watson,suggestedthatthiswillonlybepossibleforadisparateimpactchallenge
thatidentifies“aspecificemploymentpractice,”whetherornotsubjective,thatis
toguidethediscretionofallthecompany’sdecisionmakers.63
 JusticeScalia’sinterpretationofWatsontopreventitsuseasabasisfor
commonalityforaclasslikethatsoughtinWalͲMartmayormaynothave
retracteditsproblematicapplication64tounguideddelegations.Itclearlydidnot,
however,precludefindingcommonalityindisparateimpactchallengestoarange
ofsubjectivepolicies.Aslongasthepolicyistobeappliedbythosemakingor
affectingthepersonneldecisionschallengedbyallmembersoftheclass,thereis
thepotentialforcommonality.Thatpotentialmightbenegatedinchallengesto
subjectivepolicies,asinchallengestoobjectivepolicies,whereplaintiffscannot
demonstratethatanydisparateimpactfromthepolicyislikelytopervadethe
class.Formostchallengestosubjectivepolicies–asforchallengestoobjective
standardsͲͲthatconfine,ratherthanjustexpandmanagerialdiscretion,however,
thecommonalitycriterionforcertificationofaclassaffectedbymultiple
supervisorsorotherdecisionmakersshouldnotblockcertification.

61131S.Ct.at2554.
62Id.at2554Ͳ2555.
63Id.at2555,quoting487U.S.at994.
64Seepage13supra.
 ThishasalreadybeendemonstratedinlowercourtdecisionssinceWalͲ
Mart.Forinstance,inMcReynoldsv.MerrillLynch,65JudgePosnerfora
unanimouspanelreversedadistrictcourt’spreͲWalͲMartdenialofcertificationof
aclassofsevenhundredblackbrokers,currentlyorformerlyemployedbyMerrill
Lynch,whoclaimedaracialimpactderivingfromtwocompanypoliciesthat
framedthediscretionofdistrictandbranchmanagersoverdecisionsaffecting
pay.JudgePosnerdistinguishedthechallengetothesepoliciesfromthechallenge
toWalͲMart’sdelegationofunconfineddiscretionbystressingthatthepolicies–
allowingbrokerstoformtheirownaccountteamsanddistributingaccountson
thebasisofpastperformanceaffectedbytheteams–“arepracticesofMerrill
Lynch,ratherthanpracticesthatlocalmanagerscanchooseornot....”66
Similarly,inEllisv.CostcoWholesaleCorp.,67onremandfromtheCourtof
AppealsforreconsiderationafterWalͲMart,adistrictcourtheldthatthe
commonalityrequirementcouldbesatisfiedforaclassofcurrentandformer
femaleemployeeswhoweredeniedmanagerialpromotionsatCostcobecause
theplaintiffhadidentifiedspecificcompanywideemploymentpracticeswithin
Costco’spromotionsystem.68Whilesomeofthesepractices–suchasthenonͲ
postingofopenpositionsandrelianceonpromotablelistsofdesiredcandidatesͲͲ
presumablywouldhaveadisparateimpactonwomenonlyifcombinedwith
consciousorunconsciousdiscriminatoryintent,69theplaintiffsalsopresented
evidenceoftheinvolvementofhighlevelcentralmanagementthroughoutthe

65672F.3d482(7thCir.2012).
66Id.at490.
67285F.R.D.492(N.D.Cal.2012).
68Seeid.at531.
69Totheextentthatcentralpoliciesonlycausediscriminationbyenablinglowerlevelmanagers
todiscriminate,suchpoliciesarenodifferentthanthepolicyoffulldelegationrejectedasa
basisforcommonalityinWalͲMart.SomeoftheCostcopolicies,suchas“placingapremiumon
scheduleflexibilityandabilitytorelocate,”id.,couldhaveadisparateimpactintheabsenceof
discriminatoryintent,however.Cf.Dukesv.WalͲMartStores,Inc.,964F.Supp.2d1115,1127
(N.D.Cal.2014)(leavingmanagers“withoutmeaningfulguidanceinapplying…impossibly
vaguecriteria”doesnotpresentcommonquestionbecausediscriminationwillturnonhow
discretionisexercisedbyvariousmanagers).
promotionprocesstobolstertheircommonalitycasefortheirdisparateimpactas
wellastheirsystemicdisparatetreatmentchallenge.70
 SinceWalͲMartcourtslikethatinEllis71alsohaveheldthecommonality
requirementcanbesatisfiedforemployerorcompanywideclassesasserting
systemicdisparatetreatmentclaimswheretheallegeddegreeofinvolvementof
centralmanagementintheallegedlydiscriminatorydecisionsmadeplausiblethat
everymemberoftheclasscouldhavebeenaffectedbythesamediscriminatory
intent.72TheWalͲMartCourt’sholdingoncommonalityhasbeenthebasisfor

70Seealso,e.g.,Scottv.FamilyDollarStores,Inc.,733F.3d105,116Ͳ117(4thCir.2013)(finding
amendedcomplaintmadesufficientallegationofpotentialdisparateimpactfromcommon
companywidepoliciesaffectingtheentireclass);ChenͲOsterv.Goldman,Sachs&Co.,877
F.Supp.2d113,118(S.D.N.Y.2012)(decliningtostrikeclassallegationsincomplaintbecause
complaintidentifiesanumberofspecificcompanywideemploymentpracticesand“testing
procedures,”includingacoͲemployeereviewprocessandquartilerankingsystem);Calibusov.
BankofAmericaCorp.,893F.Supp.2d374,376(E.D.N.Y.2012)(onmotiontodismissbasedon
complaint,distinguishingWalͲMartbecauseofallegationsofcompanywidepoliciesthat
“systematicallyfavor[]male[s]]”
 Courtsalsohavecontinuedtorecognizethecommonissuesforclasscertification
presentedincaseschallengingobjectiveemploymentpracticessuchasscoredaptitudetestsor
physicalrequirements.See,e.g.,Gulinov.Bd.ofEduc.ofCitySch.Dist.ofNewYork,907F.
Supp.2d492(S.D.N.Y.2012)(commonalityexistedintheallegeddisparateimpactof
standardizedtests);cf.Easterlingv.Conn.Dept.ofCorrections,278F.R.D.41(D.Conn.2011)
(decliningtodecertifyclassafterresolutionofcommonissuethatarequiredtimed1.5runhad
adisparateimpactonfemaleapplicantsforemployment);cf.Stockwellv.City&CountyofSan
Francisco,749F.3d1107(9thCir.2014)(changeinpromotionalexaminationallegedtohave
disparateimpactonthebasisofageinviolationoftheAgeDiscriminationinEmploymentAct).
71See285F.R.D.at511(findingtheplaintiffs’disparatetreatmentclaimstopresentacommon
issuebecauseoftheinvolvementofcentralhighlevelmanagementinallpromotiondecisions).
72See,e.g.,Kassmanv.KPMGLLP,925F.Supp.2d453(S.D.N.Y.2013)(plaintiff’scomplaint
allegedcompanywidepoliciesandpracticesoriginatinginNewYorkheadquarters,includinga
policyofautomaticallydemotingwomen,butnotmen,whotransferfromaninternational
office);Parrav.Bashas’,Inc.,291F.R.D.360,373Ͳ376(D.Ariz.2012)(findingcommonality
satisfiedbyallegationoftwotierpaydisparitybetweentwodifferentjointlyownedstore
chainstowhichplaintiffswerediscriminatorilyassigned);Johnsonv.FlakeboardAmericaLtd.,
2012WL2237004,*5(D.S.C.2012)(allegationofraciallyhostileworkenvironmentperpetrated
andtoleratedbysamegroupofdecisionmakersintwosmallplantsinonesmalltown).Cf.
Cronasv.WillisGroupHolding,Ltd.,2011WL5007976*3(Oct.18,2011)(approvinga
settlementclassinpartbecause“thedelegationpolicy[theclass]challenge[s]hassubjected
themalltodiscriminationatthehandsofthesameregionalofficers”).
courtsdenyingclasscertificationonlyincaseswhereallmembersoftheputative
TitleVIIclasshavenotallegedlybeenaffectedbythediscriminatoryactionsofthe
samedecisionmakers.73OnegoodexampleisthefutileattemptoftheWalͲMart
lawyerstoobtaincertificationofasmallerclassdefinedbyWalͲMart’sCalifornia
regions,ratherthanbythelocalmanagerstowhomdiscretiontomakethe
challengedpersonneldecisionshadbeendelegated.74TheWalͲMartlawyers
failedtoidentify“acoregroupofbiasedupperͲlevelmanagerswhoinfluencedall
ofthechallengeddecisionsbylowerͲlevelmanagers.”75Thisultimatelyisthe
unsurprisinglessoniteratedbytheSupremeCourtinWalͲMart:Classlitigationis
appropriateonlywhereitwillbemoreefficientbecauseeachmemberofthe
requestedclasshasapotentialTitleVIIclaimthatturnsonresolutionofa
commonissue,eithertheexistenceofdiscriminatoryintent,whetherconsciousor
unconscious,fromthesamedecisionmakers,ortheunjustifieddisparateimpact
ofaspecificemploymentpracticeappliedtoallmembersoftheclass.
IV.TheWalͲMartCourt’sPronouncementonRule23(b)(2)ͲͲͲ
 Satisfactionofthecommonalitystandardandofthethreeotherconditions
setforthinRule23(a)ofcourseisnotsufficientforcertification.Plaintiffsalso
mustfitarequestedclassintooneofthethreecategoriesspecifiedinRule23(b).
Interpretingthesecondofthesespecifications,(b)(2),theCourt’sopinioninWalͲ
Martoffered,withthesupportofeveryJustice,analternativereasonwhythe
certificationoftheclasscouldnotstand.Althoughthisinterpretationposesa
greaterthreattothecertificationofTitleVIIclassactionsthandoestheCourt’s

73See,e.g.,Davisv.CintasCorp.,717F.3d476,487Ͳ89(6thCir.2013)(upholdingfindingofno
commonalitywhere“thousandsofmanagersathundredsoffacilities”madechallengedhiring
decisions);Taborv.HiltiInc.703F.3d1206,1229(10thCir.2013)(nocommonmodeof
exercisingdiscretionthatpervadestheentirecompany);Boldenv.WalshConst.Co.,688F.3d
893,896(7thCir.2012)(reversingcertificationbecauseclaimchallengednocompanywide
policy,onlyexerciseofdiscretionofvarioussupervisorsat262constructionworksites);
Bennettv.NucorCorp.,656F.3d802,808(8thCir.2011)(affirmingdenialofcertificationof
classofemployeesinalldepartmentsbecauseofdelegationofdiscretiontodepartmental
managers).
74SeeDukesv.WalͲMartStores,Inc.,964F.Supp.2d1115(N.D.Cal.2013).
75Id.at1122.SeealsoLadikv.WalͲMartStores,Inc.,291F.R.D.263,270(W.D.Wis.2013)
(plaintiffsdidnotexplainhowdecisionsofvariousmanagersinregionarelinked).
holdingoncommonality,itneednotpresentaninsurmountablebarriertothe
efficientandeffectiveclasslitigationofmeritoriousTitleVIIclaims.
 Rule23(b)(2)allowscertificationswhere“thepartyopposingtheclasshas
actedorrefusedtoactongroundsthatapplygenerallytotheclass,sothatfinal
injunctiverelieforcorrespondingdeclaratoryreliefisappropriaterespectingthe
classasawhole.”76Theruledraftersin1966intendedthisprovisiontosupport
civilrightsactionsseekingprospectiveinjunctiveanddeclaratoryrelief77andit
certainlyfitsTitleVIIactionsseekingtodeclareillegalandenjoinsome
discriminatorypracticeorpolicyofanemployer,asthemodificationofsucha
practiceorpolicycouldaffecttheinterestsofmanyemployees.Somelower
courts,however,alsohademployed(b)(2)asabasisforcertificationofTitleVII
classesseekingindividualmonetaryrelief,especiallythe“equitablerestitution”of
backpay,inadditiontoprospectiveinjunctions.78TheCourtinWalͲMartrejected
thisuseof(b)(2),unanimouslypronouncingthatanyclaimformonetaryrelief,
includingaTitleVIIclaimforbackpay,that“isnotincidentaltotheinjunctiveor
declaratoryrelief”cannotbecertifiedforclassadjudicationunderRule23(b)(2).79
 TheCourt’sinterpretationof(b)(2)issignificantforTitleVIIclassactions
becauseitrequiressuchactionstoproceedunderthemorestringent
requirementsof(b)(3).80Theserequirementsincludenotificationtoallclass
membersofthenatureoftheactionandtheirrighttobeexcludedfromtheclass
iftheysochoose.81Thenoticerequirementdiscouragesclassactionsbecauseit
imposesonplaintiffs’attorneyscoststhatgenerallycanberecoupedonlythrough
settlementorafavorablejudgment.

76Fed.R.Civ.Pro.23(b)(2).
77SeeAdvisoryCommittee’sNotes,39F.R.D.69,102(1966).
78See,e.g.,Robinsonv.LorillardCorp.,444F.2d791(4thCir.1971);Bowev.ColgateͲPalmolive
Co.,416F.2d711(7thCir.1969).
79131S.Ct.at2557.
80TherehavebeennoTitleVIIclassactionscertifiedorpersuasivelyproposedunderRule
23(b)(1),astheprovisionsofthissubsectionareframedtocoverlimitedsituationswhere
proceedingthroughindividualadjudicationscouldresultinincompatibleorderstotheparty
opposingtheclassorprejudicetootherclassmembers.SeeFed.R.Civ.Pro.23(b)(1).
81Rule23(b)(1)and(b)(2)classactions,unlike(b)(3)actions,aremandatory;classmembers
havenorighttowithdrawfromtheclass.
 Moresignificantly,therequirementsalsoincludeobtainingfindingsfrom
thecourt“thatthequestionsoflaworfactcommontoclassmembers
predominateoveranyquestionaffectingonlyindividualmembers,andthata
classactionissuperiortootheravailablemethodsforfairlyandefficiently
adjudicatingthecontroversy.”82Rule23(b)(3)furtherstatesthatthesefindings
musttakeintoaccount,interalia,“thelikelydifficultiesmanagingaclass
action.”83Theserequirementsofpredominanceandsuperioritymaybedifficultto
meetforTitleVIIclassactions,likeWalͲMart,seekingmonetaryrelieffor
individualclassmembers,becausesuchreliefonlycanbegrantedafterasecond
stageoflitigationtodeterminewhichmembersoftheclasshavebeenadversely
affectedbyadefendant’spolicyorpracticeofdiscriminationandtowhatextent.
Adefendantopposingcertificationthereforecanargue–especiallyfora
particularlynumerousclass,likethatproposedinWalͲMartͲͲthatthemany
questionsgoverningindividualclaimspredominateoverthecommonissueofthe
existenceofthepracticeorpolicyofdiscriminationandthatthedifficultyof
managingsomanyclaimsinonecourtpreventstheclassactionfrombeinga
superiormeansofadjudication.84
 TheWalͲMartCourt’sexplanationofwhythebackpayreliefsoughtbythe
plaintiffscouldnotqualifyas“incidental”totheirrequestedinjunctiveand
declaratoryreliefincludesparticularlytroublesomedictathatseemstorejectthe
mostdirectwayofdealingwiththismanageabilityproblem.TheWalͲMart
plaintiffshadarguedthatbackpayshouldbetreatedasincidentalforpurposeof
(b)(2)certificationinpartbecausetheCourtofAppealshadapprovedaremedial

82Fed.R.Civ.Pro.23(b)(3).
83Fed.R.Civ.Pro.23(b)(3)((D),
84Theavailabilityofsuchanargumentagainstcertificationofa(b)(3)classindeedmeansthat
theCourt’sunanimousstrictinterpretationof(b)(2)rendersalmostnonͲconsequentialtheWalͲ
MartCourt’sstrictinterpretationofthe(a)(2)commonalityrequirement;theWalͲMart
majoritycouldhaveupheldadenialofcertificationundersubsection(b)evenifithadassumed
allofthesubsection(a)conditions,includingcommonality,weremet.JusticeGinsberg’sdissent
fromtheCourt’sinterpretationof(a)(2),whileconcurringinitsinterpretationinits
interpretationof(b)(2),131S.Ct.2561,thuscarrieslittleforce.Ineffect,shecanchargeonly
that“theCourtimportsintotheRule23(a)determinationconcernsproperlyaddressedina
Rule23(b)(3)assessment.”Id.at2562.
trialstagetodetermineapercentageofvalidclaimsthroughdepositionsrelevant
toarepresentativesamplesetoftheclaimantclass.Thatpercentagewouldhave
beenmultipliedbythetotalnumberofmembersintheclassandtheaverage
backpayawardinthesamplesettodetermineatotalbackpayrecoverytobe
distributedequallytoallmembersoftheclass,afterareductionofattorneys’fees
ofcourse.Byrejectingthis“TrialbyFormula”85asamodificationofthetwophase
trialestablishedinTeamstersandadenialofWalͲMart’sentitlement“to
individualizeddeterminationsofbackpay,”86JusticeScaliasuggestedthatthe
Teamsterssystemalsocouldnotbemodifiedforthepurposesofmakinga(b)(3)
classmoremanageable.
 AlthoughJusticeScalia’s“TrialbyFormula”dictaisparticularlytroublesome
andopentochallenge,87theCourt’sunanimousinterpretationof(b)(2)should
nothavebeenmoresurprisingthanitsdividedinterpretationof(a)(2).The
structureofRule23drawsaclearlinebetweenreliefthatmustbeprovidedinthe
aggregateandindividualreliefthatonlymaybeaggregatedwhereitisefficientto
doso.88AsJusticeScaliaexplained,wheretheonlyreliefsoughtisinjunctiveor
declaratory“respectingtheclassasawhole,”thereisnoneedforacourtbefore
certificationtoconsiderpredominanceorsuperiorityortorequirenotificationof
anopportunitytowithdrawfromtheclass.89“Predominanceandsuperiorityare
selfevident”becauseallissuesarecommonforallappropriatemembersofthe
requestedclass.90Notificationisnotnecessaryfora“mandatory”(b)(2)class
becauseindividualclassmembersarenotallowedtowithdrawfromlitigation
thatwillefficientlysettlethesameissuesforallclassmemberswithoutresolution
ofanydistinctclaimsofindividualsthattheymaywishtolitigateseparately.If
representativesofaputativeclassseekanyformofindividualmonetaryrelief,

85Id.at2561.
86Id.at2560.
87Foracompellingcritique,seeMelissaHart,CivilRightsandSystemicWrongs,Berk.J.ofEmp.
andLab.Law,455,464Ͳ468(2011).
88AsJusticeScaliaalsostressed,131S.Ct.at2557Ͳ2558,thehistoryoftheRule’sdevelopment
andinterpretationhighlightsthesameline.
89Id.at2558.
90Id.
thisanalysisdoesnotapply;theseparateissuesposedbytheindividualclaims
requireconsiderationofpredominanceandsuperiority,andevenifthose
separateissuescanbemanagedeasily,individualswithspecialclaimsareduethe
opportunitytoelecttolitigatethemseparately.91
 TheCourt’sunanimousinterpretationof(b)(2)thusisbothabarriertoeasy
certificationofTitleVIIclassactionsandunlikelytobereversed.Itdoesnot,
however,presentaninsurmountablebarrier.EventhoughJusticeScalia’s“Trialby
Formula”dictarestrictscourts’abilitytomake(b)(3)classesmoremanageable,
theCourt’s(b)(2)analysisdoesnot,contrarytoProfessorCoffee,92soundthe
deathknellforTitleVIIclassactions.
 First,itshouldnotbegainsaidthattheCourt’sinterpretationdoesnot
obstructtheuseof(b)(2)classestoenjointhecontinuationofdiscriminatory
practicesorpolicies.Theeliminationoffuturediscriminationistheprimary
purposeofthestatute.Prospectiveinjunctionsmayincludetheimpositionof
somewhatburdensomemonitoringrequirementsonemployers.Ifacourt
recognizesacauseofactionforacompany’sseniormanagement’snegligent

91Thisanalysisstronglysuggeststhatnoindividualizedmonetaryreliefcanbesoughtbya(b)(2)
classregardlessofwhetherawardingthereliefwould“introducenewsubstantiallegalor
factualissues,[]orentailcomplexindividualizeddeterminations.”Allisonv.CitgoPetroleum
Corp.,151F.3d402,415(5thCir.1998),quotedinWalͲMart,at2560.JusticeScaliaquotesthis
test,withoutendorsingit,todemonstratethatplaintiffscouldnotmeetit,includingthrough
useofthe“TrialbyFormula”herejectsevenifitapplied.Id.at2561.Hisgeneralanalysisofthe
structureofRule23,however,indicatesthat(b)(2)classescanseeknoindividualmonetary
relief,regardlessofhoweasilysuchreliefcouldbecalculated,assomeclassmembersmight
wanttohavetheopportunitytolitigatetheirownclaims,andsuchindividuallitigation,in
contrasttoseekinganinjunctioncoveringthewholeclass,wouldbefeasible.Itseemslikely
thattheCourtwouldholdthattheonlypermissiblemonetaryreliefavailabletoa(b)(2)class
notgiventheopportunitytooptͲoutwouldbeaggregatemonetaryreliefsuchasafundfora
trainingprogramorforamonitoringsystemtopreventfurtherdiscrimination.Butsee,e.g.,
Johnsonv.MeritorHealthServicesEmploymentRetirementPlan,702F.3d364,372(7thCir.
2012)(“Shoulditappearthatthecalculationofmonetaryreliefwillbemechanical,formulaic,a
tasknotforatrieroffactbutforacomputerprogram,…thedistrictcourtcanawardthatrelief
without…convertingthis(b)(2)actiontoa(b)(3)action.”)
92SeeJohnC.Coffee,“YouJustCan’tGetThereFromHere”:APrimeronWalͲMartv.Dukes,80
U.S.L.W.93(July19,2011).
controlofdiscriminatingsupervisors,93moreover,thecourtmightissuea
particularlyrestrictiveinjunction.Whilecourtsmayenjoindiscriminatory
practicesinprivatedisparateimpactcaseswithoutclasscertification,thecourts
ofappealsuniformlyhaveheldthatprivatepatternorpracticecasesonlycan
proceedasclassactions.94
 Admittedly,foremployersweighingsettlementthethreatofacourtorder
imposingonlyprospectiveinjunctivereliefisnotcomparabletothethreatof
significantmonetarydamages.Therefore,bringinganactionforonlyprospective
injunctivereliefisnotasattractivetolawyersseekingasettlementfundfrom
whichtodrawattorneys’feesexceedingthehourlyfeesmadeavailableto
prevailingpartiesunderTitleVII’sattorneys’feesprovision.95Lawyerswill
hesitatetobeartherisksoflosinganycomplicatedpatternorpracticecaseifthey
cannotcompensateforthoseriskswiththeexpectationofabonusiftheyare
successful.Furthermore,thethreatofmonetarydamagesmaybemoreeffective
thanprospectiveinjunctionsineliminatingthecontinuationoffuture
discrimination.
 TheWalͲMartdecision,however,neitherprecludessuccessful(b)(2)class
actionsforprospectiveinjunctivereliefbeingthebasisforsuccessfulindividual
actionsformonetaryrelief,norpreventsthelawyersbringingsuch(b)(2)actions
fromprofitingfromthesubsequentactions.TheWalͲMartdecision,asnoted,96
expresslyendorsesthetwophaseTeamsterslitigationsystem,andthedecision
doesnotsuggestthatthepresumptionofliabilitytoallclassmembersestablished
byafindingofageneralpracticeofdiscriminationinthefirstphasewouldnot
carryoverintothesecondphasewherethatsecondphasewasconducted
throughindividualactions.Attheleast,preclusionlawcouldbenefitthemembers
ofaprevailingclass;theemployercouldbecollaterallyestoppedfromdenying

93Seepages10Ͳ11supra.
94SeeChinv.PortAuthorityofNewYork,685F.3f135,149Ͳ150(2dCir.2012)(andcasescited
therein).
95See42U.S.C.§2000eͲ5(k).TheSupremeCourthasadoptedthe“lodestar”orhourlyrate
methodofcalculatingattorneys’feesforcivilrightscases.See,e.g.,Hensleyv.Eckerhart,461
U.S.424(1986).
96Seepage20supra.
thegeneraldiscriminatorypracticeinsubsequentindividualactionsbroughtby
classmembers.97Thelawyersrepresentingthe(b)(2)classcouldexpecttobring
someoftheindividualactions,filingjointlyinmanycases.Theclassaction
lawyersalsocouldexpecttoreapsomefinancialgainsfromthereferralofother
cases.98
 JudgePosnerexplainedhowcertificationofa700member(b)(2)classwas
appropriateintheMcReynolds99casenotonlytodeterminewhetherMerrill
Lynch’sallegedlydiscriminatorypracticesshouldbeenjoined,butalsoto
determinetheissueoftheillegalityofthepracticesforsimplificationofthe
resolutionofindividualclaimsforpecuniaryrelief.100Afternotingthatthestakes
intheindividualbrokers’claimswould“makeindividualsuitsfeasible,”Judge
Posnerobservedthatwithoutapriorclasswidedeterminationoflegalityofthe
practices,“thelawsuitswillbemorecomplexif,untilissueorclaimpreclusion
setsin,thequestionwhetherMerrillLynchhasviolatedtheantidiscrimination
statutesmustbedeterminedanewineachcase.”101
 JudgePosnerwasnottroubledbytheprospectoftheemployerasserting
claimpreclusioninsubsequentindividualactionsformonetaryrelief.Othercourts

97Cf.ParklaneHosieryCompanyv.Shore,439U.S.322(1979)(plaintiffsmayassertevennonͲ
mutualcollateralestoppelinlegalactionbasedonpriorequitableactionnottriedtoajury).Of
course,iftheemployersuccessfullydefendedagainstthe(b)(2)class’sclaimofageneral
discriminatorypractice,theemployerwouldbeabletoassertcollateralestoppelagainstany
individualclaimantthatattemptedtoreassertsuchapractice.Butindividualclaimantscould
stillassertindividualinstancesofdiscrimination.SeeCooperv.FederalReserveBank,467U.S.
876,880(1984).
98Theinjunctivereliefindeedcouldincludearequirementthattheemployernotifyclass
membersoftheemployer’spossibleliabilitytothembecauseofitsgeneraldiscriminatory
practices.
99Seepage15andnote65supra.
100672F.3dat492.
101Id.JudgePosneralsoinvokedRule23(c)(4)tocertifytheclasstoresolvethegenerallegality
ofthechallengedpracticesforanysubsequentclaimsforpecuniaryrelief.Id.Thisapparent
invocationof(c)(4)tojustifyacertificationbeyondthosepermittedbythethreecategoriesin
23(b)wasproblematic.Seepage24infra.Itwasalsounnecessary,however,because
determiningwhetherthepracticesshouldbeenjoinedforthe(b)(2)classrequiredresolutionof
theissuesofgenerallegality,andthatresolutionwouldhavethesameeffectonactionsfor
monetaryreliefwithoutanyfurtherclasscertification.
ofappealshaverecognized“thataclassactionsuitseekingonlydeclaratoryand
injunctivereliefdoesnotbarsubsequentindividualdamageactionclaims,”even
thoughclaimpreclusionwoulddefeatthedamageactionhadthefirstactionbeen
anindividualsuit.102Thisrecognitionmustbecorrectatleastforclassactionsfor
injunctivereliefthatcouldnotaddclaimsforindividualmonetaryeitherthrough
(b)(2)classcertificationorthrougha(b)(3)classcertification.Claimpreclusionis
notappropriatelyassertedagainstclaimsthatcouldnothavebeenassertedinthe
earlieraction.103
 Tobesure,thefilingofmanypotentialTitleVIIclassactionswouldbe
discouragedifplaintiffs’lawyerscannotobtaincertificationofaclassthatcan
seekoratleastsettleclaimsformonetarydamages.Manyindividualemployment
discriminationclaimsdonotofferthepotentialpecuniaryrecoveryoftheMerrill
LynchbrokerclaimsconsideredbyJudgePosnerandthuswouldhavenopositive
valueforclassactionlawyerswithoutaggregationinanumerousclass.Incases
featuringsuchclaims,plaintiffattorneysprobablymusthavesomecontrolover
themonetaryclaimsofclassmembersfornegotiationofasettlementfundfrom
whichtorecoverfeesandcosts.
 SincetheWalͲMartdecision,however,numerouscourtshaveheldthat
(b)(3)TitleVIIplaintiffs’classescanbecertified.Somecourtshavecontinuedto

102See,e.g.,Hiserv.Franklin,94F.3d1287,1291(9thCir.1996)(“everyfederalcourtofappeals
thathasconsideredthequestionhasheldthataclassactionseekingonlydeclaratoryor
injunctivereliefdoesnotbarsubsequentindividualsuitsfordamages”).SeealsoGoochv.Life
InvestorsInc.Co.ofAm.,672F.3d402,428n.16(6thCir.1996);Wright,Miller,Cooper,18A
Fed.Prac.&Proc.Juris.§4455(2ded.)(“anindividualwhohassufferedparticularinjuryasa
resultofpracticesenjoinedinaclassactionshouldremainfreetoseekadamageremedyeven
thoughclaimpreclusionwoulddefeatasecondactionhadthefirstactionbeenanindividual
suitforthesameinjunctiverelief”).
103Inhisanalysisofthescopeof(b)(2),JusticeScaliadoesstateinWalͲMartthatamemberofa
classthathadunsuccessfullysoughtbackpay“mightbecollaterallyestoppedfrom
independentlyseekingcompensatorydamagesbased”onthesameallegedlydiscriminatory
employmentdecision.131S.Ct.at2559.This,however,onlyconfirmsthatmembersofa
plaintiffclasswholoseonalitigatedissueareestoppedfromrelitigatingthatissueagainstthe
defendantinasubsequentaction.Thisdictahasnorelevancetotheavailabilityofclaim
preclusionagainstmembersofaplaintiffs’classthatwassuccessfulonrelatedclaimsinthe
prioraction.
endorsethepractice,approvedbysomecourtsofappealsandnotrejectedin
WalͲMart,ofcertifyingamandatory(b)(2)classtoconsiderinjunctivereliefand
anoptͲout(b)(3)classtoconsiderindividualmonetaryrelief.104Althoughsomeof
thesedecisionsmaytaketoosanguineaviewofthemanageabilityofindividual
claimsformonetaryrelief,105allcanbejustifiedbyanappropriatereadingofRule
23thatisconsistentwithWalͲMart.The(b)(3)certificationsseemleast
problematicforclaimsforwhichnojuryisrequested,includingdisparateimpact
claimsforwhichTitleVIIprovidesnorighttolegaldamagesorajurytrial;106such
casesprovidetheoptionofusingmagistratestodeterminewhichclassmembers
donotdeservebackpaybecauseoftheemployerdefensesrecognizedin
Teamsters.107Insomecases,moreover,itmightbepossibletocalculatebackpay
onanaggregatebasiswithoutmodifyingthesubstantivelawthrougha“Trialby
Formula”asrejectedbyJusticeScaliainWalͲMart.108Yeteventhe(b)(3)
certificationsoflargeTitleVIIclassesseekinglegaldamagesforintentional

104See,e.g.,Gulinov.Bd.ofEduc.ofCitySch.Dist.ofcityofNewYork,907F.Supp.2d492
(S.D.N.Y.2012);UnitedStatesv.CityofNewYork,276F.R.D.22(E.D.N.Y.2011);Easterlingv.
Conn.Dep’tofCorrection,278F.R.D.41(D.Conn.2011);Johnsonv.FlakeboardAmericaLtd.,
2012WL2237004(D.S.C.2012);Ellisv.CostcoWholesaleCorp.,285F.R.D.492,535Ͳ544(N.D.
Cal.2012).
105See,e.g.,Ellisv.Costco,supra,at540(findingclaimsforindividualrelieffrom700Ͳmember
classmanageable).
106See42U.S.C.§1981A(a)(1)(nodamagereliefindisparateimpactcases)and(c)(righttojury
trialavailableonlywherecomplainingpartyseeksdamages).
107Seepage6supra.
108Forinstance,inEasterling,supranotexx,thecourtconcludedthatthenumberofwomen
excludedbyanunjustifiedphysicaltestcouldbedeterminedbyacomparisonofapriorperiod
duringwhichthetestwasnotused.278F.R.D.at50n.6.TheEasterlingcourtalsonotedthat
determiningwhichwomenwouldhavebeenhiredbutforthetest“wouldbeimpossible”
becausethetestwasusedasascreeningdeviceearlyinthehiringperiod.Id.at48Ͳ49.The
courtconcludedthatindividualissuessuchascurrentqualificationsandindividualmitigation
effortscouldbetreatedwithoutmakingtheclassunmanageable.Id.at50.SeealsoCityofNew
York,supranotexx,at(inchallengetodiscriminatorywrittenexaminations,“[b]ecauseitis
impossibletodetermineexactlywhichnonͲhirevictimswouldhavereceivedjoboffersand
whichdelayedͲhirevictimswouldhavebeenhiredintheabsenceofdiscrimination,thecourt
mustfirstdeterminetheaggregateamountofindividualrelieftowhichthesubclassesare
entitledandthendistributethatreliefproratatoeligibleclaimants.”).
discriminationcanbejustifiedbyuseoftheauthorityprovideddistrictjudgesby
Rule23(c)(4).109
 Rule23(c)(4)providesthat“[w]henappropriate,anactionmaybebrought
ormaintainedasaclassactionwithrespecttoparticularissues.”110Thisdoesnot
provideanadditionalcategorytosupplementthethreealternativetypesofclass
actionslistedinRule23(b);111certificationrequiresmeetingtherequirementsof
oneofthethreepartsofRule23(b).Rule23(c)(4),however,allowscourtsto
considerwhethertherequirementsofRule23(b)wouldbemetifthecauseof
actionwerebifurcatedbyissues,onlysomeofwhichwouldbelitigatedforthe
entireclass.112Contrarytotheclaimsofmanagementattorneyswhowouldliketo
extractthe(c)(4)provisionfromRule23,113thisunambiguousandgenerally
acceptedmeaningof(c)(4)114doesnotobviatethepredominanceandsuperiority
requirementsof(b)(3).115If(c)(4)isemployedtosevercertainissuesforclass

109ForinvocationofthisauthorityinrecentTitleVIIdecisionsconsideringhybridcertifications,
see,e.g.,Costco,supra,at544;Gulino,supra,at507;McReynolds,supra,at490;CityofNew
York,supra,at33.
110Fed.R.Civ.Pro.23(c)(4).
111Rule23(c)providessupplementaryrulesandtoolsforcourts;itdoesnotaddtothethree
classactioncategoriessetforthin(b).Oneofthetools,(c)(4),istomaintainaclassaction“with
respecttoparticularissues.”Suchanissueclasshastomeetthethreerequirementsofoneof
thepartsofsubsection(b).SeeLauraHines,ChallengingtheIssueClassActionEndͲRun,52
EmoryL.J.709,752Ͳ759(2003)(1966advisorycommitteethatdraftedtheissueclassprovision
intendeditbeusedtocomplementnotsupplanttheRule23(b)categories).
112See,e.g.,McReynoldsv.MerrillLynch&Co.,672F.3d482(7thCir.2012);InreNassauCnty.
StripSearchCases,461F.3d219(2dCir.2006);Valentinov.CarterͲWallace,Inc.,97F.3d1227
(9thCir.1996).SeegenerallyJosephSeiner,TheIssueClass,56B.C.L.Rev.xxx(2015).
113See,e.g.,RobertRachal,PageGriffin&MadelineChimentoRea,LaborandEmploymentand
ERISAClassActionsAfterWalͲMartandComcast–PracticePointsforDefendants(PartIIͲRule
23(b)),41Emp.Dis.Rep.862,863Ͳ65(Dec.11,2013).
114See,e.g.,ManualforComplexLitigation(Fourth)§21.25,273(2004)(Rule23(c)(4)
authorizesacourtto“achievetheeconomicsofclassactiontreatmentforaportionofacase,
therestofwhichmayeithernotqualifyunderrule23(a)ormaybeunmanageableasaclass
action”);seealsoCharlesAlanWright,FederalPracticeandProcedure§1790(3ded.2014);2
WilliamB.Rubenstein,NewbergonClassActions§4:89(5thed.2013).
115InCastanov.AmericanTobaccoCo.,84F.3d734,745n.21(5thCir.1996),theCourtof
AppealsfortheFifthCircuitseemedtoendorsetheviewthat(c)(4)cannotbeusedtosever
issuestoachievepredominance:“ReadingRule23(c)(4)asallowingacourttoseverissuesuntil
treatment,thepredominanceandsuperiorityrequirementsstillmustbeapplied
todeterminewhetherclasstreatmentofjustthoseissueswillservetheefficiency
goalofRule23.Insomecases,classlitigationofacommon,butperipheralissue
thatisnotantecedenttoseparateindividualissues,ratherthanofanantecedent
pivotalissuethatcoulddisposeofallindividualclaims,willnotbeefficient.Class
litigationofaperipheral,nonͲpivotalissuemaybewastedlitigationifmore
complicatedindividualactionsinvolvingthesamefactsmustfollowbeforerelief
canbegrantedordenied.Similarly,severanceofacommonissueoffactorlaw
doesnotnecessarilyrenderclasslitigationofthatissueandindividuallitigationof
otherissuesasuperiormethodofadjudication.Severancemaymakethe
litigationofthecommonissuemanageable,buttheother“matterspertinent”to
superioritylistedin(b)(3)mayweighinfavorofseparateactions.116Other
litigationalreadymayhavebegunandthevarianceinthevalueofclaimsmay
indicatethatclassmembersshouldcontroltheprosecutionofalltheirparticular
cases,includingthecommonissue.
 InthetypicalTitleVIIdisparateimpactordisparatetreatmentpatternor
practicecase,however,theissueofwhetherchallengedemploymentpracticesor
decisionmakingprocessesarediscriminatoryandillegalisalmostalwaysthe
centralpredominantissueuponwhichindividualactionsformonetaryreliefmust
hinge.Decidingthatissuecollectivelyratherthaninindividualactionsalmost
alwayswillbemoreefficientandfairerthandecidingitmultipletimesandin

theremainingcommonissuepredominatesovertheremainingindividualissueswould
evisceratethepredominancerequirementofRule23(b)(3);theresultwouldbeautomatic
certificationineverycasewherethereisacommonissue,aresultthatcouldnothavebeen
intended.”InCastano,anationalmasstortclassactionagainstthecigarettecompaniesseeking
compensationfornicotineaddiction,variationsingoverningstatelawrenderedpredominance
questionableevenafterseverance.Subsequentdecisionsofthiscourt,however,havefound
predominancewhereparticularissuescanbedecidedtogetherandwouldbepivotaltoall
cases.See,e.g.,Mullenv.TreasureChestCasino,LLC,186F.3d620,626(5thCir.1998)(“the
commonissuesinthiscase...arenotonlysignificant,butalsopivotal”).
116Theseinclude“theclassmembers’interestsinindividuallycontrolling”theirclaim;the
extentandnatureoflitigationalreadybegun;andwhetheritisdesirabletoconcentratethe
litigationintheparticularforum.SeeFed.R.Civ.Pro.2323(b)(3)(A)Ͳ(C).
variouswaysinindividualactions.117Furthermore,decidingtheissueinaseparate
collectiveactiondoesnotpresentmanageabilitychallenges.Decidingitina
separateactioninsteadsimplifiesandadvancesactionsforindividualrelief.118
Althoughotherfactors“pertinent”tosuperioritymayweighagainstcertification
insomecases,119thereisnononͲformalisticargumentofanymeritfornever
usingtheRule23(c)(4)provisiontomakeTitleVIIlitigationmoreefficientandfair
throughissueseverance.120 

117Thepredominanceinquiryinvolvesnotacomparisonofnumberofissues,butrather
whethercertification“wouldachieveeconomiesoftime,effort,andexpense,andpromote
uniformityofdecisionastopersonssimilarlysituated,withoutsacrificingproceduralfairnessor
bringingaboutotherundesirableresults.”Myersv.Hertz,624F.3d537,547(2dCir.2010).See
alsoAmchemProductsInc.v.Windsor,521U.S.591,615(1997)(Rule23(b)(3)isintended“to
covercasesinwhichaclassactionwouldachieveeconomiesoftime,effort,andexpense,and
promote…uniformityofdecisionastopersonssimilarlysituatedwithoutsacrificingprocedural
fairnessorbringingaboutotherundesirableresults.”)
118Usinga(b)(3)issueclassalsomaybeappropriateinsystemicdisparatetreatmentlitigation
forthecommonissuesposedbypunitivedamagesclaims.InKolstadv.AmericanDental
Association,527U.S.526(1999),theCourtheldthatsuchdamagesareavailablewhenthe
discriminatingagentknewoforrecklesslydisregardedtheillegalityofhisaction,commonlaw
agencyͲbasedliabilityprinciplesapply,andtheemployerhasnotmadegoodͲfaitheffortsto
complywithTitleVII.Id.at538,545Ͳ546.Inasystemicdisparatetreatmentcase,allofthese
prerequisitespresentcommonissuesthatcanbedecidedmostefficientlyandfairlyinonecase
ratherthaninnumerousindividualcases.Ajuryempaneledfora(b)(3)systemicdisparate
treatmentcasecoulddecidewhethertheemployer’sconductwasnotonlyillegal,butalso
subjecttoliabilityforpunitivedamages.Thisjuryalsomightsetamultiplierfactorthatcouldbe
appliedtosuccessfulindividualclaimsforothermonetaryreliefconsistentwiththemaximum
allowedbythecapsoncompensatoryandpunitivedamagessetbythe1991Act.2U.S.C.§
1981A(b)(3).AsexplainedbythecourtinEllisv.Costco,supranotexx,at540Ͳ544,havingthe
availabilityofpunitivedamagesdeterminedbythesamejurythatdeterminestheexistenceofa
patternorpracticeofdiscriminationwouldavoidpotentialSeventhAmendmentproblems
posedbysubsequentjuriesreexaminingfindingsofthe(b)(3)liabilityjurybecausethe
“classwideliabilityquestion…mayoverlapsubstantiallywiththequestionofwhether
Defendantactedwithmaliceorrecklessindifference.”Id.at543.
119Seenote116supra.
120Themanagementattorneyshavenotdoneso.AlthoughProfessorHinescriticizesusing
“issueclassactionsasanalternativetononͲpredominating(b)(3)classactions”toachieve
“automaticpredominance,”Hines,supranote111,at723,sheseemstoacceptapplyingthe
(b)(3)standardstothefullactionafteruseofthe(c)(4)issueclasstool.Id.at725Ͳ728.
 Contrarytotheclaimsofsomemanagementattorneys,121certificationof
TitleVII(b)(3)issueclassesisnotpreventedbytheCourt’spostͲWalͲMart
decisioninComcastCorp.v.Behrend,122acaseinvolvingantitrustclaimsofaclass
ofconsumersinaregionalproductmarket.TheCourtinComcaststatedthat
beforecertifying(b)(3)classescourtsmustprovidethesame“rigorousanalysis”
totherequirementofpredominancethattheWalͲMartdecisionrequiredbe
giventocommonalityunder(a)(2).123Thisrigorousanalysis,theCourtheld,must
includeconsiderationofwhether“[q]uestionsofindividualdamagecalculations
willinevitablyoverwhelmquestionscommontotheclass.”124TheCourtheldthat
thedistrictcourtcertifyingtheclassinComcastfailedtoapplythisstrictstandard
becauseplaintiffsdidnotofferanefficientmeanstocalculatedamagesflowing
fromthetheoryofantitrustliabilitythatthedistrictcourtrecognizedcould
potentiallyestablishliabilitytoallmembersoftherequestedclassof
consumers.125
 AsstressedbytheComcastdissenters,however,themajorityopinion
“shouldnotbereadtorequire,asaprerequisitetocertification,thatdamages
attributabletoaclassͲwideinjurybemeasurableonaclassͲwidebasis.”126Asthe
dissentalsonoted,lowercourtsinarangeofcaseshaveheldthatindividual
damagecalculationsdonotnormallypreclude(b)(3)classcertification.127What
madetheComcastcertificationspecial,beyondthefactthat“theneedtoprove
damagesonaclassͲwidebasis”wasnotchallengedbytheplaintiffs,128wasthe
lackofademonstratedconnectionbetweenthetheoryofcommonliability

121See,e.g.,SachaHenryandJohnM.Landry,TheNewNormal:TheNeedforDamagesProof
ToCertifyConsumerClassesPostͲComcast,82U.S.L.W.1861(June3,2014);JoelS.Feldman
andDanielR.Thies,Comcast’sLastingImpact:CrystallizationandAffirmationoftheRule
23(b)(3)PredominanceRequirement,82U.S.L.W.1815(May27,2014).
122133S.Ct.1426(2013).
123Id.at1432.
124Id.at1433.
125Id.at1433Ͳ1434.SeeInreUrethaneAntitrustLitigation,768F.3d1245,1257Ͳ1258(10thCir.
2014)(ComcastdidnotrestontheabilitytomeasuredamagesonaclassͲwidebasis).
126Id.at1435,1436(JusticesBreyerandGinsburgdissenting).
127Id.at1437.
128Id.
acceptedbythedistrictcourtforclasslitigationandtheproofofindividual
damages;proofofantitrustliabilitytoallclassmembersunderthetheory
recognizedasviablebythecourtwouldnothavebeenabasisformovingforward
theindividualclaimsfordamagesbecausetheplaintiffsofferednomethodto
isolateforindividualclassmemberstheantitrustimpactacceptedbythedistrict
courtforclasstreatmentfromother“distortions”ofapurecompetitivemarket
thattheplaintiff’sexpertattributedtothedefendant’sactions.129Thus,the
plaintiffs’liabilitycasewasnotconsistentwithandcouldnotadvancetheirclaim
fordamages.
 Bycontrast,undertheTeamsterstwophasemodelforTitleVIIpatternand
practicelitigation,proofofliabilitybasedonadiscriminatorypatternorpracticeis
consistentwithandwouldadvancetheadjudicationofindividualclaimsfor
monetaryrelief.Thoseindividualclaimsmightormightnotmakeunmanageable
litigationoftheentireactioninonecourt,butproofofageneralpracticeof
discriminationwouldstillbethepredominantissueintheaction,andthe
manageabilityproblemcouldbemitigatedbytheuseofanissueclassforthe
generalliabilityissue.NothingintheComcastdecision,likenothingintheWalͲ
Martdecision,callsintoquestionsuchauseof(c)(4)tomakeclasscertificationan
efficientandfairtoolforlitigation.130

129Id.at1433Ͳ1434.
130TherealsoisnothingintheWalͲMartorComcastdecisionssuggestingthattheSeventh
Amendmentwouldrestrictlitigatingthrougha(b)(3)issueclassonlythedeterminationof
whethertheemployerengagedinapatternorpracticeofdiscrimination,leavingdamage
calculationstosubsequentcasesbeforedifferentjuries.Thereexaminationclauseofthe
SeventhAmendmentprohibitsanyreconsiderationinasubsequentcaseofwhathasbeen
decidedbyajury:“nofacttriedbyajury,shallbeotherwisereexaminedinanyCourtofthe
UnitedStates....”Separatejuriesthuscannotdecidethesameissue.TheTeamsterstwophase
system,however,fullyseparatestheissueoftheexistenceofapatternorpracticeof
discriminationfromtheissuesthatmustbedecidedtodeterminewhichmembersofthe
plaintiff’sclassactuallyhavebeenaffectedbyanysuchdiscriminatorypatternorpracticeand
towhatextentthoseaffectedhavebeenharmed.Thesecondremedialphaseonlyproceedsifa
patternorpracticeisdemonstrated,andwhereithasbeendemonstrated,itsexistenceis
acceptedasanunchallengeablepremiseforlitigationinthesecondphase.Nothinghas
changedsinceProfessorHart’sexplanationinMelissaHart,WillEmploymentClassActions
Survive,37AkronL.Rev.813,831Ͳ833(2004).
 Insum,theWalͲMartdecision’spredictablyrestrictiveinterpretationof
Rule23neednotposeinsuperablebarrierstoprivateclassactionsunderTitleVII.
Itspronouncements,onbothsubsection(a)(2)andsubsection(b)(2),shouldnot
havebeenasurprisetotheplaintiff’sbar,andevenitsmosttroublesomedicta
against“TrialbyFormula”neednotbeheardandhasnotbeenheardasadeath
knellforTitleVIIclassactions.
TheRobertsCourt,however,throughaggressiveinterpretationsoftheFAA
hasofferedmostprivateemployerstheoptionofforeclosingsuchactions.Itis
theseinterpretations,muchmorethantheWalͲMartdecision,thatCongress
mustaddressifclassactionsaretoplayaneffectiveroleintheenforcementof
TitleVII’scommands.
V.ArbitrationasaClassActionBarrierͲͲ
 TheCourt’suseoftheFAAtoerodetheprivaterightofactionofferednot
onlybyTitleVII,butalsobyotherfederalantiͲemploymentdiscriminationlaws
andemployeeͲprotectionlaws,beganaboutthetimeCongressattemptedto
strengthenTitleVIIthroughpassageoftheCivilRightsActof1991.InGilmerv.
Interstate/JohnsonLaneCorp.,131acloselydividedCourtheldthatanemployer
couldenforceanemployee’sagreementtoprocessinprivatearbitrationrather
thanincourtaclaimundertheAgeDiscriminationinEmploymentAct(ADEA),132
eventhoughtheagreementwasnotnegotiatedandhadtobesignedasa
conditionoftheemployee’semployment.133TheagreementenforcedinGilmer
wasimposedbyathirdͲpartyregulator;134however,adecadelatertheCourt
confirmedthattheFAAcoversmostemploymentcontractsinCircuitCityStores,
Inc.v.Adams,135astateantiͲdiscriminationlawcasechallenginganagreementto
arbitrateimposedbyCircuitCity’semploymentapplication.TheCircuitCityCourt

131500U.S.20(1991)(5Ͳ4).
13229U.S.C.§621etseq.
133500U.S.at23.
134InordertosecureemploymentwithInterstate,Gilmerhadtoregisterasasecurities
representativewiththeNewYorkStockExchange,whichrequiredhimtosubmittoarbitration
“anycontroversy”withhisemployer.Id.
135532U.S.105(2001).
interpreted“involvingcommerce”intheFAA’soperativesection2136tocoverall
employmentcontractssubjecttoCongressionalregulationoutsidethe
transportationindustry,137eventhoughtheFAAwasenactedin1925beforethe
CourtexpandedCongress’powertoregulateinterstatecommerce,andeven
thoughsection1oftheFAAexempts“contracts”notonlyof“seamen”and
“railroademployees,”butalso“anyotherclassofworkersengagedinforeignor
interstatecommerce.”138ThereisnothinginGilmerorCircuitCityStoresthat
suggeststheCourtwouldtreatdifferentlyobligationsimposedonemployeesby
theiremployerstoarbitrateTitleVIclaimsandthecourtsofappealswithout
dissentnowacceptsuchimpositions.139
 Providingemployerswiththediscretiontorequiretheiremployeesto
accepttheredirectionofstatutoryantiͲdiscriminationclaimsfromjudicialto
privatearbitralforumsalsowouldseemtoenableemployerstorequiretheir
employeestosacrificebringinganycollectiveactioninajudicialratherthaninan
arbitralforum.MorerecentdecisionsoftheRobertsCourt,moreover,have
clarifiedthatemployersalsocanrequireemployeestoagreetoonlyindividual
arbitrationsandthustosacrificetheoptionofbringingacollectiveactioninany
forum.

1369U.S.C.§2.
137Id.at109.
1389U.S.C.§1.TheCourt’sdecisioninCircuitCityStores,likeitsdecisioninGilmer,wasclosely
divided.Thedissentsobjectedtothemajority’sstrainedinterpretationoftheexemptionin
section1oftheFAAof“contractsofemploymentofseamen,railroademployees,oranyother
classofworkersengagedinforeignorinterstatecommerce.”532at124.JusticeSouter
contrastedthemajority’sexpansiveinterpretationof“involvingcommerce”intheoperative
section2tocoverallcontractswithincurrentCongressionalpowerwiththemajority’s
restrictiveinterpretationof“interstatecommerce”insectionone’sexemptiontocoveronlythe
transportationindustry.JusticeStevensinhisdissentusedthelegislativehistorytoexplainwhy
theexemption’sexpressexclusionof“seaman”and“railroademployees”wasconsistentwith
JusticeSouter’sinterpretationoftheFAAratherthanwiththatofthemajority.Id.at133.
139See,e.g.,EEOCv.Luce,Forward,Hamilton&Scripps,345F.3d742(9thCir.2003)(andcases
citedtherein).TheCourtnotedinGilmertherangeofstatutoryclaimsthatithasheldmaybe
subjecttoanenforceablearbitrationagreement,includingthoseunderthesecuritieslaws,the
antitrustlaws,andRICO.500U.S.at37.TheGilmerCourtiteratedthatapartytoanarbitration
agreementhastheburdenofdemonstratingthatCongress“intendedtoprecludeawaiverofa
judicialforum”underaparticularstatute.Id.
 TherearetwoimportantlimitationsontheforceoftheFAA,both
potentiallyapplicabletoemploymentcontracts,andbothpotentiallyprotective
ofemployees’abilitytopressactionscollectively,atleastinarbitration.First,
sectiontwooftheFAAincludesasavingsclausethatallowstheinvalidationor
nonͲenforcementofarbitrationagreementson“groundsasexistatlaworin
equityfortherevocationofanycontract.”140Sincesuchgroundsincludea
contractbeingunconscionable,sectiontwomightprovideonetooltolimitthe
FAA’srestrictionofcollectiveactions.Second,theCourthasiteratedinnumerous
decisionsthattheFAAallowsonlythewaiverofaproceduralrighttoajudicial
forum,notthewaiverofanysubstantiverights;thus,a“prospectivelitigant”
mustbeableto“effectivelyvindicate”a“federalstatutoryrightinthearbitral
forum.”141IfasubstantiverightguaranteedbyTitleVIIorbyanotherantiͲ
discriminationstatuecannotbe“effectivelyvindicated”inanindividualaction,
perhapsbecauseofitslowpotentialvalue,compellingindividualarbitrationcould
betreatedascompellingthesacrificeofasubstantiveratherthanonlyofa
proceduralright.
 InlightofrecentdecisionsoftheRobertsCourt,however,neitherlimitation
ontheforceoftheFAAcanbeusedtopreserveemployees’abilitytobring
collectiveactions,eveninarbitration,simplybecauseoftherelativelylowvalue
ofindividualdiscriminationclaims.First,inAT&TMobilityLLCv.Vincent
Corporation,142anarrowlydividedCourt,inapredictablealignment,heldthat
California’sunconscionabilitydoctrinecouldnotbeappliedtocondition
enforcementofanimposedagreementtoarbitrateontheimposingparty’s
consenttoclassͲbasedorcollectivearbitration.143TheNinthCircuitCourtof
AppealshadfoundanarbitrationagreementinAT&T’s“TermsandConditions”
forwirelessservicebothprocedurallyandsubstantivelyunconscionableunder

1409U.S.C.§2.
141See,e.g.,14PennPlazaLLCv.Pyett,556U.S.247,273Ͳ274(2009);GreenTreeFinancial
Corp/ͲAla.v.Randolph,531U.S.79,90(2000);Gilmer,supra,at29;MitsubishiMotorsCorp.v.
SolerChryslerͲPlymouth,Inc.,473U.S.614,634(1985).
142131S.Ct.1740(2011).
143Id.at1753.ThefiveͲJusticemajorityincludedtheChiefJusticeandJusticesScalia,Thomas,
Kennedy,andAlito.
Californialawbecauseitprecludedclassactionsthroughacontractofadhesion
andtherebyallowedthecompany“todeliberatelycheatlargenumbersof
consumersoutofindividuallysmallsumsofmoney.”144JusticeScalia,writingfor
themajority,assertedthatdespitethesavingsclauseinsection2,theFAAcan
preemptstatelawthat,althoughneutralonitsface,is“appliedinafashionthat
disfavorsarbitration.”145Thus,California’sunconscionabilitylawcannotbeused
as“anobstacletotheaccomplishmentoftheFAA’sobjectives,”and“[r]equiring
theavailabilityofclasswidearbitrationinterfereswithfundamentalattributesof
arbitration,”anddiscouragesitsadoption.146Classarbitration,Scaliaargued,
“sacrificestheprincipaladvantageofarbitrationͲͲͲitsinformality–andmakes
theprocessslower,morecostly,andmorelikelytogenerateproceduralmorass
thanfinaljudgment.”147Furthermore,classwidearbitrationposesrisksbeyond
eventhoseposedbyclasswidelitigationfordefendantsbecauseoftheabsence
ofcloseandmultilayeredjudicialreview.148DespiteJustice’sScalia’sattackson
classarbitration,however,heleftthedoorajartoan“effectivevindication”
argumentinaresponsetothedissentingJustices’argumentthatclass
proceedingsarenecessarytoensuretheprosecutionofsmallclaims:AT&T’s
agreement,JusticeScalianoted,providedthatitwouldpayclaimants“aminimum
of$7,500andtwicetheirattorney’sfeesiftheyobtainanarbitrationaward
greaterthanAT&T’slastsettlementoffer.”149
 TwoyearslaterinAmericanExpressCo.v.ItalianColorsRestaurant,150the
Courtnonethelessslammedthedoorshutonthe“effectivevindication”
argumentasabasisforpreservingtheoptionforclasswidearbitrationofclaims
thatareotherwisenoteconomicallyviable.InthiscaseItalianColorsandother
merchantsbroughtaclassͲwideactionincourtagainstAmericanExpress,alleging
thatAmex’scredit“cardacceptanceagreement”violatedantitrustlaw.TheCourt,

144SeeLasterv.AT&TMobilityLLC,584F.3d849,854(9thCir.2009).
145Id.at1747.
146Id.at1748.
147Id.
148Id.at1752.
149Id.at1753.
150133S.Ct.2304(2013).
inanotherpredictable5Ͳ4alignment,heldthatthemerchantscouldnotbringthe
actionbecausetheagreementincludedacommitmenttoarbitrateclaimswithout
useofclassarbitration.151Themerchantscontendedthatenforcingtheclass
waiverwouldpreventthe“effectivevindication”oftheirrightsbecausenoneof
themerchantsindividuallywouldhaveanadequateeconomicincentivetopayfor
theexpertanalysisnecessarytoprovetheclaim.152JusticeScalia,againwritingfor
themajority,rejectedanyargumentbasedoneconomicincentives,narrowly
construingthe“effectivevindication”doctrinetoapplyonlyiftherewasan
obstructionofaccesstoaforumtovindicatetherights.153JusticeScaliaasserted
thatthehighcostofprovingastatutoryclaimisdistinctfromthe“eliminationof
therighttopursuetheremedy.”154Heinsteadconcludedthat“FAA’scommandto
enforcearbitrationagreementstrumpsanyinterestinensuringtheprosecution
oflowͲvalueclaims.”155
 Thus,aslongasthewaiverspreserveformalaccesstosomeforum,
employeescannotabrogateimposedwaiverstolitigateorarbitrateindividual
claimsjointlybydemonstratingthattheycannotachieve“effectivevindication”
throughindividualactions.Ifsuchformalaccessispreserved,the“effective
vindication”doctrineonlyguaranteescollectiveorclasslitigationorarbitrationof
collectiveratherthanindividualrights.Iftherightonlycanbeasserted
collectively,thenawaiverofcollectiveorclasslitigationandarbitrationwould
constituteawaiverofasubstantiveratherthanonlyaproceduralright.
TitleVII,however,providesnoprivatecollectiveaction.Section707ofthe
Actauthorizesthegovernment,butnotprivatevictimsofillegaldiscrimination,to
bringactionsagainst“apatternorpracticeofresistance”totheAct’s
antidiscriminationcommands.156TitleVIIprivateclassactionsareaggregationsof
theprivateindividualcivilactionsthatareauthorizedundersection706(f)when

151Id.at2308Ͳ2312.
152Id.at2310.
153Id.at2310Ͳ2011.
154Id.
155Id.at2312n.5.
15642U.S.C.§2000eͲ6(a).
thegovernmentchoosesnottosettleorlitigateachargeofdiscrimination.157The
Court’sdevelopmentanduseofthesametwophaseFranksͲTeamsters
proceduralmodelinprivatesection706classactions,158aswellasinpublic
section707actions,doesnotconvertthesubstantiverightsassertedinthe
formerintoageneralcollectiverightlikethatassertedinthelatter.Nordoessuch
aconversionderivefromthelowercourtsnotacceptinguseofthisprocedural
modelinnonͲcollectiveprivateactions.159Similarly,the1991Act’scodificationof
thedisparateimpact“unlawfulemploymentpractice”160didnotincludeany
provisionforacollectivesubstantiverighttobeassertedindependentlyofthe
individualactionsauthorizedundersection706(f).
Thus,theCourtthroughitsinterpretationsoftheFAA,ratherthanthrough
itsinterpretationofRule23,hasprovidedemployersoutsidethetransportation
industrywithaclearroutetoescapeclassandotherformsofcollectiveactions
underTitleVIIorotheremploymentregulatorystatutes.Employeerightsactivists,
likeconsumeradvocatesandshareholderactivists,shouldgiveprioritytothe
modificationoftheFAA,ratherthantothemodificationofRule23.
GiventhealignmentofthecurrentCourt,acomprehensivemodification
willhavetocomefromCongressionalaction.Itwillnotderivefromtheclever
recentattemptoftheNationalLaborRelationsBoardtodilutetheCourt’sFAA
jurisprudenceforemploymentlaw.TheBoardfirstheldinD.R.Horton,Inc.161in
2012,andthenreaffirmedinMurphyOilUSA,Inc.,162inOctober,2014,that
employersviolatetheNationalLaborRelationsAct(NLRA)byrequiringtheir
employeestowaivetherighttobringcollectiveactionsineitherajudicialoran

15742U.S.C.2000eͲ5(f).
158Seepages5Ͳ6supra.
159Seepage22andnote94supra.
16042U.S.C.2000eͲ2(k).
161D.R.Horton,Inc.,357N.L.R.B.No.184(2012).
162361N.L.R.B.No.72(2014).
alternativearbitralforum.163ThisholdinghasnotbeenacceptedinanyCourtof
Appeals164andwouldberejectedbythecurrentSupremeCourt.
Tobesure,theNLRAsecuresfromemployerinterferencetherightto
engagein“concertedactivitiesforthepurposeofcollectivebargainingorother
mutualaidorprotection,”165andemployerscannotconditionemploymentonan
individualemployee’swillingnesstowaivethatrightinwholeorinpart.166
Furthermore,theBoardhaslongappropriatelyunderstoodlitigationasanactivity
thatcantakeaprotectedconcertedform.167Employersthuscannotcondition
employmentonemployees’willingnesstocommittonottakeconcertedactionto
utilize,secure,orexpandanyavailableproceduralrightstoengageincollective
adjudications.
TheNLRA’ssubstantiveprotectionofemployees’concertedutilizationof
proceduralrightsdoesnotmeanthattheNLRArequiresemployerstogrant
particularproceduraladjudicatoryrights,however.168TheNLRAitselfneither

163Id.
164HortonitselfwasrejectedbyadividedpanelintheCourtofAppealsfortheFifthCircuit.D.R.
Horton,Inc.v.NLRB,3737F.3d344(5thCir.2013).TwootherCourtsofAppealsindecisions
reversingthedenialofmotionstocompelarbitrationhaverejectedthereasoningofHortonin
dicta.Sutherlandv.Ernst&YoungLLP,726F.3d290,297n.8(2dCir.2013);Owenv.Bristol
Care,Inc.,702F.3d1050,1053Ͳ54(8thCir.2013).ForacompellingcriticismoftheFifthCircuit
decision,seeCatherineL.Fisk,CollectiveActionsandJoinderofPartiesinArbitration:
ImplicationsofD.R.HortonandConcepcion,35Berk.J.ofEmp.andLab.L.175(2014).
16529U.S.C.§157.
166Topermitemployerstoconditionemploymentonanemployee’swillingnesstosacrificethe
protectionofconcertedactivityofcoursewouldnegatethe“righttoselfͲorganization”
guaranteedbytheAct.29U.S.C.157.Cf.also29U.S.C.103(NorrisͲLaGuardiaActinvalidationof
contractualpromisesnottojoinorremainamemberofaunion).Thus,whiletheBoardhas
allowedmajoritycollectivebargainingrepresentativestowaivecertainrightstoconcerted
action,e.g.NLRBv.RockawayNewsSupplyCo.,345U.S.71(1953)(noͲstrikeclausein
collectiveagreementrendersconcertedeconomicstrikeunprotected),ithasneverallowed
suchwaiverbyindividualemployees.
167See,e.g.,LeMadriRestaurant,331N.L.R.B.269,275Ͳ76(2000);NovotelNewYork,321
N.L.R.B.624(1996);SpandscoOil&RoyaltyCo.,42N.L.R.B.942,948Ͳ49(1942).SeealsoBrady
v.Nat’lFootbalLeague,644F.3d661,673(8thCir.2011).
168TheBoard’sexpansioninD.R.HortonofthescopeofemployeerightssecuredbytheNLRA
canbehighlightedbycontrastingtherighttoconcertedactionapprovedbytheCourtinNLRB
v.Weingarten420U.S.251(1975).AsstatedinWeingarten,theBoardconstruestheNLRAto
guaranteesanyrighttoproceedcollectivelyinajudicialorarbitralforumnor
assumesanysuchrightexists.Rule23,forinstance,wasnotevenadopteduntil
severaldecadesaftertheenactmentoftheNLRA.169Indeed,beforeD.R.Horton
theBoardhadneverinterpretedtheNLRAtorequireemployerstoparticipate
withmultipleemployeesinanyparticularproceduralsystemshortofthe
collectivebargainingwithamajorityrepresentativethattheActdirectly
protects.170Thus,theNLRA’ssubstantiveprotectionofemployeeutilizationof
collectiveadjudicationdependsontheavailabilityofsuchadjudicationasdefined
byexternalprocedurallaw,includingRule23,whichtheCourtinitsdecisions
interpretingtheFAAhasheldissubjecttomodificationinemploymentcontracts
withbothindividualemployees171andcollectivebargainingrepresentatives.172
TheCourtthatdecidedCircuitCityStores,Concepcion,andItalianColors–albeit
allwronglyinmyviewͲͲwillnotallowtheBoardtoexpandNLRAͲguaranteed
rightsforthepurposesofadvancingtheprocedureofcollectiveadjudication.The
CourthasmadeclearthattheFAA,notanyotherfederalstatute,setsthe
proceduralrulesgoverningarbitrationofemploymentcontractswithinitsscope.
SincetheCourtwillnotallowafederalagency,oranylowercourt,tomark
aroutetocircumventtheCourt’sFAAjurisprudence,theplaintiffs’employment
barandcivilrightsadvocatesshouldjoinforceswithmanyotherinterested
parties,includingconsumeradvocatesandotherclassactionlawyers,toseeka
legislativemodificationoftheFAA.SuchamodificationintheFAA,notinRule23,

create“astatutoryrightinanemployeetorefusetosubmitwithoutunionrepresentationtoan
interviewwhichhereasonablyfearsmayresultinhisdiscipline.”Id.at256.TheBoard,
however,doesnotrequiretheemployertoprovidesuchaninterviewwithaunion
representativepresent.Thus,theemployeehasarighttotakeconcertedactionwithaunion
representativetoattempttosecureacollectiveprocedure,buttheemployeedoesnothavea
righttobegrantedthatprocedure.
169TheNLRAwaspassedin1935,49Stat.449(1935,andsubstantiallyamendedin1947,61
Stat.136(1947)and1959,72Stat.519(1959).Rule23wasadoptedin1966.
170Employees,forinstance,havenoNLRAͲguaranteedrighttopresentgrievancestotheir
employer,eitherindividuallyorasagroup.SeeEmporiumCapwellCo.v.WesternAddition
CommunityOrganization,420U.S.50,61n.12(1975).
171SeeCircuitCityStores,Inc.v.Adams,532U.S.105(2001).
172See14PennPlazaLLCv.Pyett,129S.Ct.1456(2009).
shouldbegivenpriority.173EvenintheabsenceofapostͲWalͲMartamendment,
Rule23canbeemployedbyrealisticandpragmaticlawyersasaneffectivetoolin
theenforcementofTitleVII.

173CongressalreadyhaspassedlegislationrestrictingpreͲdisputeagreementstoarbitratecertaintypesof
employeeclaims.SeeDoddͲFrankWallStreetReformandConsumerProtectionAct,18U.S.C.§1514(e)(2)
(renderinginvalidpreͲdisputeagreementsrequiringarbitrationofcertainwhistleblowerclaimsunderfederallaw);
Dept.ofDefenseAppropriationsAct,2010Pub.L.No.111Ͳ118,§8116(prohibitingfederaldefensecontractors
withcontractsofovera$1,000,000fromconditioningemploymentonagreementtoarbitrateTitleVIIclaimsor
tortclaimsinvolvingsexualassaultorharassment).SeealsoExec.Order13,673,§6(July31,2014)(requiring
federalcontractorswithcontractsexceeding$1,000,000toagreenottoarbitrateTitleVIIclaimsortortclaimsfor
sexualassaultorharassmentabsentavoluntarypostͲdisputeagreement).
